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COMMENTARY
The Reach of ICC Jurisdiction Over
Non-Signatory Nationals
JordanJ. Paust*
A new International Criminal Court (ICC) was created on July
17, 1998 under the Rome Statute adopted by the United Nations
Diplomatic Conference on Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court.' Under the Statute, the ICC will
have jurisdiction over crimes of genocide, certain crimes against
humanity, and certain war crimes, leaving the crime of aggression
2
for further definition.
Nonetheless, there are certain preconditions to the exercise of
such jurisdictional competence, as noted especially in Articles 12-14
of the Statute. In general, the Court can exercise jurisdiction if a
"situation" or case (1) is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party
to the treaty, (2) is referred to the Prosecutor by the U.N. Security
Council, or (3) is under an investigation initiated by the Prosecutor
proprio motu.3 Article 12 adds that when a State Party has referred
* Law Foundation Professor, University of Houston Law Center.
1.
United Nations: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N.
Doc. No. A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998), reprintedin 37 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 999
(1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].

2.
3.

See id. art. 5.
See id. art. 13.
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investigation, "the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more
of the following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted
the jurisdiction of the Court" by special declaration: "(a) The State
on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the
crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of
registration of that vessel or aircraft; [or] (b) The State of which the
4
person accused of the crime is a national."
The Executive Branch of the United States apparently considers
that a U.S. national could not be tried before the ICC if the United
States does not ratify the treaty.5 Is this a proper interpretation of
the treaty or of international law more generally? Assume, for
example, that Italy and Yugoslavia have ratified the treaty and the
United States has not, and that war crimes within the jurisdiction
of the ICC6 are alleged to have been committed by a U.S. national

4.
Id. art. 12(2)-(3).
5.
See David J. Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal
Court,93 AM. J. INT'L L. 12, 18 (1999). But see id. at 18, 20. The theory is not that
the Rome Statute does not reach nationals of non-signatories, it admittedly does, see
id. at 18, 20, but that it should not do so as a matter of more general international
law that supposedly requires state consent for creation of a tribunal to try its
nationals. See id. at 18.
6.
War crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC are addressed in Article 8,
as supplemented by Article 21(1)(b) and 21(3). See Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts.
8, 21(1)(b), 21(3). Every violation of the law of war is a war crime. See, e.g., JORDAN
J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 24, 84-86, 744,
761, 967-69, 984-94 (1996); DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE:
U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF THE
ARMY
FIELD
MANUAL
FM 27-10, para. 499

(1956). Nonetheless, war crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC are quite limited.
Article 8 even states that war crimes "Ifgor the purpose of this Statute... means,"
thus indicating that other war crimes are not covered. See Rome Statute, supra note
1, art. 8(2); see also id. art. 10 ("Nothing ...
shall be interpreted as limiting or
prejudicing in any way existing... rules of international law for purposes other than
this Statute."); id. art. 22(3) ("shall not affect the characterization of any conduct as
criminal under international law independently of this Statute."). The phrase "in
particular" in article 8(1), however, is not a limiting phrase but one emphasizing the
fact that jurisdiction will exist especially or particularly when listed factors occur. See
id. art. 8(1). Crimes against humanity covered by article 7 of the Statute (which also
contains the phrase "[flor the purposes of this Statute," see id. art. 7(l)) are also not
meant to reflect all customary crimes, see id. arts. 5(1), 10, 22(3), and are limited
beyond the reach of customary international legal instruments, which, for example,
do not contain limiting words such as "widespread" or "systematic" and do not fuse
persecution types of crimes against humanity into those concerning attacks on
civilians. Compare id. art. 7 with PAUSTETAL., supra, at 1030-31, 1035-38, 1054-62;
Irwin Cotfer, Regina v. Finta, 90 AM. J. INTL L. 460 (1996); Jordan J. Paust, Threats
to Accountability After Nuremberg: Crimes Against Humanity, LeaderResponsibility and
National Fora, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 547 (1995); Leila Sadat Wexler, The
Interpretationof the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of Cassation' From
Touuierto Barbie and BackAgain, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 289 (1994); Leila Sadat
Wexler, Prosecutions for Crimes Against Humanity in French Municipal Law:
InternationalImplications, 97 PRoc. AM. SOC. INT' L. 270, 271-73 & n.13 (1997). In
any event, as the cited writings demonstrate, the number of direct victims can be
small and as few as 3, 7, 11, 30, or 44. See also Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T

2000]

REACH OF ICC JURISDICTION

(now being held in Italy) while acting within the territory of
Yugoslavia. In such a scenario, can either Yugoslavia or Italy
properly refer the case to the Prosecutor? Can the Prosecutor
rightly initiate an investigation proprio motu? Can Italy render the
accused to the ICC for prosecution?
Some might assume simplistically that merely because the
United States does not ratify the treaty, its nationals cannot be
subject to prosecution before the Court. Normally, nonsignatory
nationals are not bound by crimes or norms newly created by a
treaty.7 However, that is not what is involved when a new tribunal
is established in order to prosecute what admittedly are alleged
violations of customary international law-that is, law already extant
at the time of an alleged offense and that had created crimes over
which there is a universal jurisdictional competence and
responsibility.8
Under international law a state, such as Italy, that has on its
territory 9 a person reasonably accused of war crimes under
customary international law has both the competence and
responsibility either to initiate prosecution of such a person or to
extradite or render such a person to another forum. Universal
competence and responsibility pertain whether or not the accused
is an Italian national, the victims were Italian, or the crime took
place within Italy. Yugoslavia would have the same competence and
responsibility under international law, as would the United States.
It is also certain that Italy can agree with another state or group
of states to set up a tribunal to carry out such responsibility and
can render to such a tribunal any person reasonably accused of a
crime under customary international law who is found in territory
under its control. 10 That is what happened when the United States
agreed with France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, but not

(Sept. 2, 1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1401 (1998) (indicating that the number of
direct victims were as few as 3, 5, 8 and 8).
7.
See, e.g., PAUST ET AL., supranote 6, at 95, 102-03, 105.
8.
See, e.g., id. at 74-84, 95-110; JORDAN J. PAUsr, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAw
OF THE UNITED STATES 392-93, 405-07 (1996) (concerning such prescriptive and
enforcement competence and responsibility).
9.
Thus, territorial jurisdiction to enforce pertains. See PAUST, supra note
8, at 393, 395 n.9 (concerning enforcement jurisdiction under international law that
is often territorially based but can extend into other territory by consent).
10.
No known treaty or rule of customary international law precludes such an
arrangement for the exercise of jurisdiction. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), [1927]
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 4, 18-19 ("Restrictions upon the independence of States
cannot.., be presumed.... [International law] leaves them.., a wide measure of
discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules.... [D]iscretion
[is] left to States by international law....").
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Germany, to set up the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
(IMT at Nuremberg)." As the IMT at Nuremberg affirmed:
The Signatory Powers [to the London Agreement of 8 August 194512
creating the Charter of the IMT at Nuremberg] created this
Tribunal... and made regulations for the proper conduct of the Trial.
In doing so, they have done together what any one of them might
have done singly, for it is not to be doubted that any nation has the
right to set up special courts to administer the law. With regard to
the constitution of the Court, all that the defendants are entitled to
ask is to receive a fair trial on the facts and law. 13

Thus, a German defendant could not complain that the IMT at
Nuremberg lacked jurisdiction over crimes that any state could
prosecute because each state creating or agreeing to the competence
of the IMT had "done together what any one of them might have
done singly." Indeed, they could create such a tribunal with or
without the consent of Germany, and the tribunal could, and did,
prosecute German nationals even when the accused had not
committed crimes within the territory of the United States, France,
Great Britain, or the Soviet Union and were not nationals of any of
the constituting states.
It is also telling that the U.N. General Assembly has declared
with respect to war crimes and crimes against humanity:
3.

States shall co-operate with each other on a bilateral and
multilateral basis with a view to halting and preventing war
crimes and crimes against humanity, and shall take the domestic
and international measures necessary for that purpose.

11.
See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985) ("these
tribunals and their proceedings were based on universal jurisdiction"); see also M.
CHERIF BAssIoum & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 200-01 (1996) ("The [London] agreement imposed the
IMT on the defeated power without even the presumption of its acquiescence. In the
Far East, US General Douglas MacArthur... unilaterally established the IMTFE....
There was, in this instance, no treaty and no participation in the institution-creating
process by the defeated party."); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW
AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION
126, 163-65 & n.109, 717-20 (1961) (IMT at Nuremberg was an "international"
tribunal despite the lack of consent of Germany and other Allied Powers, and it
applied international law over which universal jurisdiction pertains); TELFORD TAYLOR,
NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 80, 82 (1970) (IMT at Nuremberg was
an international tribunal "and exercised a jurisdiction internationally conferred*
regarding "international penal law").
12.
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals
of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. It had been
noted that there was a need to create a tribunal especially for the trial of war
criminals "whose offenses have no particular geographical location." The Tripartite
Conference in Moscow, Anglo-Soviet-American Communiqrun, 9 DEPT. ST. BULL. 307,
311 (1943). This point was addressed by the IMT at Nuremberg in its Opinion and
Judgment.
13.
Opinion and Judgment, International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (Oct.
1, 1946), reprintedin PAUST ET AL., supra note 6, at 900, 904.
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...

States shall assist each other in detecting, arresting and bringing
to trial persons suspected of having committed such crimes ....

States shall not grant asylum to any [such] person ....

14

Impliedly, the General Assembly's declaration reflected a general
expectation that not only would it be appropriate for states to create
bilateral or multilateral institutional processes to assist in
prosecuting such international crimes, but also that such action
may be required as part of the duty to engage in bilateral and
multilateral cooperative efforts to halt, prevent, and prosecute such
crimes. Such duties were also tied to obligations under the U.N.
Charter. 15
Given the unassailable competence of Italy to participate in the
creation of an ad hoc international criminal tribunal (like the IMT at
Nuremberg) to prosecute violations of customary international law
and to render to such a tribunal any person accused of such crimes
found within territory under its control, it is certain that Italy can
participate in the creation of the new ICC by treaty with or without
the consent of the United States and that Italy can transfer part of
its universal jurisdictional competence and responsibility to the ICC
by such a constitutive treaty. It is also certain that Italy could
render any such person to the ICC for trial if there is universal
jurisdiction over the alleged criminal activity, unless the constitutive
treaty precludes Italy from rendering a non-signatory's national to

the ICC.
Viewing Article 13 of the Statute again, it is clear from the
ordinary meaning of the language of the article considered in
context 16 that the Court can exercise jurisdiction if the case has

14.
G.A. Res. 3074, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess, Supp. No. 30, at 79, U.N. Doc.
A/9326 (1973).
15.
Resolutions recognize that a refusal "to co-operate in the arrest,
extradition, trial and punishment" of such persons is contrary to the U.N. Charter
Wand to generally recognized norms of international law." G.A. Res. 2840, U.N.
GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 88, U.N. Doc. A/8592 (1971); see also G.A. Res.
3074, supra note 14; G.A. Res. 96, U.N. Doc. A/64, at 188 (1946).
16.
This is a primary basis for proper interpretation of a treaty. For example,
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reads: "A treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." See Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 3 1(1),
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340. Also important as aids for interpretation would be relevant
international law. See, e.g., i. art. 31(3)(c); Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(1)(b)
& (3). Since customary international law allows a state to create an ad hoc
international tribunal with others and to render any accused found in territory under
its control to such a tribunal, such customary international law is a necessary
background for adequate interpretation of various provisions of the Rome Statute.
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been referred to the Court by a State Party, such as Italy or
Yugoslavia in the hypothetical. 17 The only qualification under
Article 13 involves a reference to Article 14, that is, "[t]he Court may
exercise its jurisdiction" if a State Party refers a situation "to the
Prosecutor... in accordance with article 14."18 Article 14 merely
requires that the "crimes [be] within the jurisdiction of the Court"
and "appear to have been committed." 19 Indeed, if the Prosecutor
20
investigates proprio motu, the Court will also have jurisdiction.
The only limitation on these competencies in Article 12 is the
requirement that either the state on whose territory (or the
equivalent thereof) the crime has been committed or the state of
nationality of the accused be a party to the treaty or must have
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court by special declaration to that
effect. 2 ' There is simply no requirement in Article 12 that the state
of nationality of the accused be a party to the treaty or accept the
jurisdiction of the Court. 22 The alternative expressly set forth in
Article 12 is that the state on whose territory the alleged crime was
committed must either be a signatory or must agree to the Court's
jurisdiction. Mahnoush Arsanjani, who served as Secretary of the

Professor Cherif Bassiouni has stated that some 5000 delegates broke into some
15 informal working groups during the Rome Conference, that all texts were in
English, that there was little or no communication between different working groups,
that many states did not have enough people to cover each working group, that
portions of text were still being received on July 15th, and that there was insufficient
time for review of any drafts, much less the full text. See M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Remarks During the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law
(March 23, 1999); see also Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference
on an InternationalCriminal Court: The NegotiatingProcess,93 AM. J. INTL L. 2, 9-10
(1999); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Negotiatingthe Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 443, 449-53, 457-59 (1999)
[hereinafter Bassiouni, Negotiating the Treaty]; Scheffer, supra note 5, at 20. It is
unlikely then that much authoritative legislative history exists and that any drafts
were considered and agreed upon by the full conference prior to agreement on the
full document on July 17th.
17.
See Rome Statute, supranote 1, art. 13(a).
18.
Id.
19.
See id. art. 14(1).
20.
See id.arts. 13(c) & 15(1).
21.
See id. art. 12(2) & (3).
22.
This had been one of the earlier proposals, but such a limitation of ICC
jurisdiction 'enjoyed limited support" and was rejected. See Kirsch & Holmes, supra
note 16, at 9. A U.S. proposal was also rejected that would have required consent
of "the state of nationality of the alleged perpetrator in the event either [the state on
whose territory the crime occurred or the state of nationality] was not a party to the
treaty." Scheffer, supranote 5, at 20; see also Bassiouni, Negotiating the Treaty,
supranote 16, at 458 n.64 ("The United States... wanted jurisdiction to be subject
to the consent of the state of nationality of the prospective defendant but that was
opposed by most states."); Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the
InternationalCriminal Court 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 22, 26 ("The overwhelming majority of
states ... could not agree to requiring the consent of the state of the nationality of
the accused as a prerequisite for the court's jurisdiction..
").
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Committee of the Whole at the Rome Conference, affirms that Article
12 sets forth this territorial state alternative, adding that, at least
when a situation is referred by the Security Council, "the court will
have jurisdiction . .. even if committed in non-states parties by
nationals of non-states parties and in the absence of consent by the
territorial state or the state of nationality of the accused."23 As
David Scheffer, the U.S. ambassador who led the U.S. delegation at
Rome, also recognizes, "[ujnder the treaty's final terms, [nationals
of] nonparty states would be subjected to the jurisdiction of the
court... under Article 12,"24 and
Article 12 of the ICC treaty reduces the need for ratification of the
treaty by national governments by providing the court with
jurisdiction over the nationals of a nonparty state. Under Article 12,
the ICC may exercise such jurisdiction over anyone anywhere in the
world . .. if either the state of the territory where the crime was
committed or the state of nationality of the accused consents... [and
thus] the treaty exposes nonparties ...."25

In this sense, the ICC will be able to exercise a form of limited
universal jurisdiction.
Paragraph 1 of Article 12 provides no further guidance, stating
merely that if a state becomes a party it "thereby accepts the
jurisdiction of the Court."2 6 Thus, there is no requirement that a
27
state be a party in order to accept the jurisdiction of the Court,
and, like customary international law, there is no requirement that
the state of nationality of the accused be a party or accept the
jurisdiction of the Court. For these reasons, it would be improper
to assume that Article 12 obviates any universal jurisdictional
competence that signatory states have under customary
international law and can delegate to a newly created institution.
Further, one should not assume that the jurisdictional competence
of the Court will only be based either on territorial or nationality
prescriptive jurisdiction. 2 8 Again, Articles 12, 13, and 14 are

23.
Arsanjani, supra note 22, at 26. Arsanjani also noted that "the court may
... exercise jurisdiction if either the state where the crime was committed or the
state of nationality of the accused is party to the statute or has consented to the
court's jurisdiction."
24.
Scheffer, supranote 5, at 20.
25.
Id. at 18.
26.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 12(1).
27.
Article 12(3) provides: "If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to
this Statute is required .... that State may, by declaration ... accept." Id. art. 12(3).
This phrase, with the word "[i]f," even assures that a non-signatory need not accept
in every case.
28.
But see Jonathan I. Charney, Progressin Intemational CriminalLaw?, 93
AM. J. INT'L L. 452, 456 (1999) (missing the fact that a limited universal jurisdiction
is possible under the Statute). Concerning territorial and nationality prescriptive
jurisdiction under customary international law, see, for example, PAUST, supranote
8, at 388-91.

8
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consistent with conferral of a limited universal jurisdictional
competence.
Importantly also, universal concern and competence are express
and implied in the preamble 2 9 to the Rome Statute, especially the
portions "[a]ffirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole must not go unpunished and
that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures
at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation,"
stating that the Rome Conference is "[d]etermined to put an end to
impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes... ," and "[r]ecalling
that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction
over those responsible for international crimes," a duty with respect
to international crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC that is
based at least in part on universal jurisdictional competence and
Also important is the preambular provision
responsibility.3 0
stressing that the conferees were "[d]etermined to these ends ... to
establish an independent permanent International Criminal Court
... with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole."3 1 It would entirely thwart
these ends, stated affirmations, and determinations to assume that
ICC jurisdiction could only occur if the state of nationality of the
accused was a signatory or had specially consented to the
jurisdiction of the ICC. Indeed, there is no indication that such a
policy-thwarting assumption is actually part of the treaty. These
recognized ends, affn-mations, and determinations, which are
consistent with customary international law, are also part of the
object and purpose of the treaty, a necessary and significant factor
32
for adequate interpretation of a treaty under the law of treaties.
Indeed, such general legal policies are obviously at stake when the
international community has made a significant and historic effort
to assure adequate prosecution of some of the most serious
international crimes in a permanent International Criminal Court.
Article 17 of the Statute does not change this result.
Nevertheless, it provides both a signatory and non-signatory with
the power to exercise a concurrent jurisdictional competence to
which the Court might defer in a given case. Under Article 17,

The preamble to a treaty is necessarily a part of the treaty for purposes
29.
of interpretation of any other part of the treaty. See Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, supra note 16, art. 31(2).
Rome Statute, supra note 1, preamble.
30.
31.
Id.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 16, art.
32.
31(1). Recall that customary international law is also relevant background for
interpretive purposes. See generally supranote 16.
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the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where:
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which
has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution; [or]
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has
jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute
the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the
unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute;

[or]
(c)

The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which
is the subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not
33
permitted under [other portions of the Statute].

Article 17 expressly refers to "a State" and is not limited to a State
Party. As all states have prescriptive jurisdiction over customary
international crimes and can enforce that jurisdictional competence
when an accused is within their control, it is possible, for example,
that a non-signatory state will be investigating or prosecuting a case
involving its national at the time when another state refers that
matter to the Prosecutor or the Prosecutor is investigating proprio
motu. In such a circumstance, Article 17 could preclude ICC
jurisdiction under the terms of the ICC's constituting instrument. It
is also evident, however, that the ICC can"retain jurisdiction if, for
example, a non-signatory that is investigating or prosecuting an
accused is unwilling or unable genuinely to investigate or
prosecute.3 4 Additionally, Article 18(1) contemplates investigation
by the ICC Prosecutor when a non-signatory state also "would
normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned."35
One problem presented by the hypothetical involves
interpretation of the phrase "a State which has jurisdiction" found
in Article 17. The United States has nationality and universal
prescriptive jurisdiction over the accused U.S. national, but would
the United States have enforcement jurisdiction if that individual
were in Italy? Is enforcement jurisdiction required under Article 17,
or is prescriptive jurisdictional competence sufficient? The United
States apparently could conduct an investigation of the accused in
absentia even though Italy had custody and was exercising
enforcement jurisdictional competence because the accused U.S.
national was found in Italian territory. If the United States is
conducting an investigation, it is a state, among others, that has
prescriptive jurisdiction. If prescriptive jurisdiction is sufficient
under Article 17, this circumstance is covered by Article 17(l)(a), as
long as the investigation is being conducted in good faith. If, under
Article 17, enforcement jurisdiction must exist in the United States

33.
34.
5, at 19.
35.

Rome Statute, supranote 1, art 17(1); see also id. arts. 19(2)(b) & 20(3).
This point is admitted by Ambassador Scheffer. See Scheffer, supranote
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 18(1).

10
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at the time of the investigation,3 6 then a U.S. investigation would not
preclude ICC jurisdiction when Italy is exercising its enforcement
jurisdiction and, for example, Italy renders the accused to the Court
or the Prosecutor initiates proceedings upon an Italian or
Yugoslavian referral or does so proprio motu. In view of the fact that
human rights law prohibits trials in absentia,"' it is obvious that the
United States would not actually be prosecuting the accused U.S.
national while such person was in the custody of Italian authorities.
Nonetheless, a circumstance might arise in which an accused
U.S. national is actually being prosecuted in a U.S. military courtmartial in Italy under the North Atlantic Treaty: Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA)3 8 and any other agreements with Italy. In such
a case, Article 17(1)(a) of the Statute would be applicable, as the
United States would have both concurrent prescriptive and
enforcement jurisdictional competencies. When Italy is holding an
accused U.S. national, the United States could request pursuant to
NATO SOFA that Italy hand over such an individual who is a
member of the "force" (including "personnel belonging to the land,
sea, or air armed services... in the territory... in connexion [sic]
with their official duties")3 9 because, although under customary
international law both states have a prescriptive jurisdictional
competence, under NATO SOFA Article VII(3)(a)(ii), the United States
has primary concurrent jurisdiction over "offences arising out of any
act or omissions done in the performance of official duty."40 It can
be recognized that international crime is not properly classifiable
under the SOFA as an act or omission done in the performance of
"official duty."4 1 On the other hand, it might be argued that the

36.
Article 18(2) may be relevant. It addresses the circumstance where "a
State" (presumably including a non-signatory state) "is investigating or has
investigated its nationals or others within its jurisdiction." Yet, this may refer to
territorially-based enforcement jurisdiction or forms of prescriptive jurisdiction other
than territorial. It is not clear. See id. art. 18(2).
37.
See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19,
1966, art. 14(3)(d), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 177; PAUST ETAL., supranote 6, at 379, 769; cf.
id. at 856-57.
38.
Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the
Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792 [hereinafter SOFAI.
39.
Id. art. I(1)(a); see also id. art. VII(5)(a) (concerning requests for the
handing over of an accused).
40.
Id. art. VII(3)(a)ii).
41.
Several U.S. cases have held that acts in violation of intemational law are
not public acts of a state. See, e.g., Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 175-76
(D. Mass. 1995); Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 673 (D.D.C. 1980).
Addressing customary international law with respect to acts that are beyond the
scope of lawful authority, the IMT at Nuremberg affirmed:
The principle of international law, which under certain circumstances
protects the representatives of a state, cannot be applied to acts which are
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phrase "arising out of' might reach beyond acts actually classifiable
as "official duty" activities. 4 2 Yet even then the act or omission out
of which the offense arises must be "done in the performance of
official duty," and international criminal acts cannot properly be
classified as acts done in performance of official duty.4 3 To avoid
such a problem, the United States might want to supplement Status
of Forces Agreements with a new provision: "The sending State shall
have primary jurisdiction over members of its force accused of
international crimes committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the receiving State." The phrase "outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the receiving State" should be added because such a state
predictably will be reluctant to waive jurisdiction over international
crimes allegedly occurring on its territory, especially when its
nationals are the victims of such crimes.
It is also telling that Article 89(1) and 90(4)-(6) contemplate
Article 90 clearly
jurisdiction over non-signatory nationals.
contemplates ICC competence and primacy when a requesting state
has a jurisdictional competence but is not a party to the Statute.
Such a circumstance could arise when a non-signatory requesting
state with nationality jurisdiction uses such a basis for its request
Thus, in the
for surrender or extradition of its national.
hypothetical, if the United States requests Italy to surrender the
U.S. national to the United States and not to the ICC, Italy shall give
priority to the ICC's request if the Court has determined that the
case is "admissible" and if Italy "is not under an international
obligation to extradite the person to the requesting State."4 4 What
Article 90 also necessarily recognizes is that the Court has the

condemned as criminal by international law. The authors of these acts
cannot shelter themselves behind their official position," and one "cannot
claim immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the State if the
State in authorizing action moves outside its competence under international
law.
Opinion and Judgment, IMT at Nuremberg (1946), supra note 13. For related
recognitions, see PAUST, ET AL., supra note 6, at 14, 21-25, 46, 108-10. Since
customary international law is a necessary background for proper interpretation of
any treaty, see supra note 16, international law concerning the scope of public
authority or official duty recognized, for example, at Nuremberg must condition the
meaning of NATO SOFA.
42.
With respect to crimes under domestic law, the scope of the SOFA "official
duty" clause has been the subject of debate. See, e.g., Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524
(1957); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ARMY PAM. No. 27-161-1, INTERNATIONAL LAW 126-27

(1964), adding: "France maintains that offenses requiring specific intent could not
arise out of the performance of official duty." Id. at 126.
43.
See supra note 40.
44.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 90(4). This may present an inconsistency
with Article 17(a) where Italy is also investigating or prosecuting in good faith, but
under Article 17(a) the Court would declare that the case is inadmissible and Article
90(4) should not apply.
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power to determine "that the case is admissible" when a nonsignatory state (the United States) has requested a signatory state
(Italy) to surrender its national. 4 5 Thus the Court clearly can
exercise jurisdiction over the national of a non-signatory in many
circumstances.
Moreover, there is a significant consistency
between, and thematic resonance emanating from, the preamble to
and Articles 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18(1), and 90 of the Statute.
Further, as explained below, nothing in Article 98 changes these
recognitions and thematic vibrations.
An interesting problem arises with respect to possible interplay
between NATO SOFA and Article 90(4) and 90(6) of the ICC Statute.
If the United States has primary concurrent jurisdiction over an
offense under NATO SOFA and requests Italy to surrender the
accused to the United States pursuant to such treaty, is Italy "under
an international obligation to extradite the person to the requesting
State" within the meaning of Article 90(4) or (6) of the
Statute? NATO
SOFA
allocates
concurrent
prescriptive
competencies. As between the United States and Italy, the normal
consequence of the existence of an agreed primary concurrent
jurisdiction in the United States would be that, upon request, Italy
would surrender a U.S. accused to the United States. This
consequence may even be viewed as an implied obligation to
surrender under Article VII(5)(a), which states: "The authorities...
shall assist each other in the arrest of members of a force.., and
in handing them over to the authority which is to exercise
jurisdiction in accordance with the above provisions."" Yet, by
agreeing to "assist. . . in handing them over," has Italy thereby
consented always to hand them over-or merely to assist when
handing them over-and not to extradite such an accused to a third
country pursuant to an extradition treaty or to an institutional
process pursuant to some other treaty?4 7 Perhaps, but if not, NATO

45.

Id.

46.
SOFA, supranote 38, art. 7(5)(a).
47.
Indeed, in case of an unavoidable clash among these three types of
treaties, which should prevail? Can Italy choose to obey one, but thereby set up a
breach of another, leading to normal remedies, if any, for breach? Should the Rome
Statute prevail because of its more widespread adherence, its relationship to
fundamental humanitarian law and universal jurisdictional competencies and
obligations, and its greater significance as an international criminal law treaty? It
is preferable that the ICC Statute prevail, especially in view of universal jurisdictional
responsibilities based in customary international law that are also a necessary
background for adequate and policy-serving interpretation of each treaty. See supra
note 16.
Further, a mere bilateral extradition treaty should not be interpreted to obviate
universal jurisdictional competence and responsibility. Here again, customary
international law must condition the meaning of the bilateral treaty. Professor
Jonathan Charney has argued, however, that the bilateral extradition treaty between
Spain and the United Kingdom, with the doctrine of speciality, would preclude Spain

2000]

REACH OFICC JUISDICTION

SOFA does not create an "obligation to extradite" to the United
States within the meaning of Article 90(4) or (6) of the Statute.
Further, technically the surrender of an accused in Italy pursuant

from prosecuting former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet for customary
international crimes other than those for which he was extradited by the United
Kingdom. See Charney, supra note 28, at 455 & n.24. The doctrine of speciality has
that sort of effect with respect to prosecutions of ordinary domestic crimes. However,
the doctrine is itself a principle of customary international law and the full meaning
or reach of that principle should be addressed in connection with other customary
international legal obligations, especially those pertaining to international crime.
Further, the U.N. General Assembly has recognized that a failure to initiate
prosecution or to extradite persons reasonably accused of serious international
crimes such as war crimes and crimes against humanity and a "refusal to cooperate
in the arrest, extradition, trial and punishment of such persons is tied to a breach
of obligations under the U.N. Charter. See supra notes 14-15. U.N. Charter
obligations clearly override even unavoidably conflicting provisions of other
international agreements. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 103. There may also be an issue
whether Pinochet as a criminal accused has standing to raise the doctrine of
speciality. Courts are split in the U.S., although the preference is for individual
standing. See, e.g., PAUST ET AL., supra note 6, at 351-52.
With respect to genocide, under customary international law from which no
derogation is permitted, the United Kingdom has a duty to either initiate prosecution
of or to extradite all persons within it territory who are reasonably accused of
genocide. Article I and V of the Genocide Convention expressly require that the
United Kingdom enact appropriate legislation 'to prevent and to punish" (art. I) and
'to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in particular, to
provide effective penalties . . . . (art. V). Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, arts. 1, 5, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280.
That genocide, ajus cogens prohibition, is not prosecutable in the United Kingdom
results from its breach of Articles I and V of the Genocide Convention. Thus, a lack
of dual criminality (which occurs if genocide or a similar offense, regardless of name,
is not a crime in both the United Kingdom and, for example, Spain) results from the
U.K.'s breach of the Genocide Convention. For the international community then to
accept the claim that it will not extradite Pinochet for genocide because of the
doctrine of dual criminality, that it will only extradite for torture, and that under the
doctrine of speciality Spain thereafter cannot prosecute for genocide would be to
enlarge the functional immunity for genocide that exists under British domestic law
merely because of its breach of the Genocide Convention to an unacceptable
immunity from prosecution for genocide in Spain (or apparently anywhere) and to
preclude Spain from complying with its duties under the Genocide Convention and
customary international law. Clearly, dual criminality and speciality must not apply
to preclude universal jurisdictional competence and responsibility concerning
international crimes. Clearly also, a state must not be allowed to insist on imposing
the consequences of its breach of the Genocide Convention on other states. Dual
criminality and speciality are also necessarily obviated to the extent that their
application would be inconsistent with a peremptory norm, from which no derogation
is permitted, such as the duty to either initiate prosecution or to extradite those
reasonably accused of genocide.
More generally, a state party to a treaty, such as an extradition treaty, cannot set
up its own breach of that treaty or any other international obligation as an excuse
for nonperformance or a claimed impossibility. See Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, supra note 16, art. 61 (2); see also id. art. 26 (must perform treaty
obligations on good faith). Further, '[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.' Id. art. 27.
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to NATO SOFA is not "extradition." If this technical approach is
adopted, Article 90 should not be interpreted to allow an exception
to the primacy of the ICC in the case of competing requests by the
United States and the ICC for surrender of the accused, since NATO
SOFA does not create an obligation to extradite.
Another problem involving other international agreements is
raised by Article 98(2), which precludes the ICC from proceeding
"with a request for surrender which would require the requested
State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international
agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is
required to surrender a person of that State to the Court."4 8 No
such agreement is known to exist. For example, NATO SOFA does
not preclude every sort of rendering of an accused U.S. national to
another state or to an international tribunal. It arguably only
precludes a rendering when the United States has exclusive or
primary concurrent jurisdiction over an offense, but this limitation
is unclear because NATO SOFA does not expressly require consent
of the sending State concerning extradition or rendering to a third
State or to an international tribunal. Further, NATO SOFA makes
no mention of "the Court" created by the Rome Statute and thus
does not require "the consent of a sending State" "to surrender a
person of that State to the Court." More generally, Article 98 does
not preclude ICC jurisdiction over the nationals of a non-signatory
or require consent of the state of nationality in most cases. It might
also be argued that Article 98(1) can preclude such jurisdiction in
some cases, for example when the request to surrender "would
require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations
under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic
immunity of a person."4 9 International law, however, simply does
not permit immunity of a person accused of customary international
50
crime.
From the foregoing, the ICC clearly will have jurisdiction over
many non-signatory nationals and will be allowed to exercise a form
of limited universal jurisdiction. Thus, whether or not the United
States ratifies the Rome treaty, ICC jurisdiction over an accused

48.
Rome Statute, supranote 1, art. 98(2).
49.
Id. art. 98(1).
50.
Such nonimmunity has been recognized with respect to heads of state,
former heads of state, foreign ministers, diplomats, other government officials, and
others. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kambanda, reprintedin 37 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
1411 (Intl Crim. Trib. for Rwanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, 1998); Opinion and
Judgment, International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, supra note 13, reprintedin
PAUST ET AL., supra note 6, at 711-12; Rome Statute, supra note 1, preamble
("Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes"), arts.
27-28; PAUsT, supra note 8, at 208, 210-11, 276-79 nn.547-48, 283-84 nn.580-81;
PAUST ETAL., supra note 6, at 21-25, 32-41, 43, 46, 53, 60-72, 74-78, 108-11, 707-08,
711-12, 765-66, 774, 811-12, 833-44, 889-97, 984, 1082, 1395-96.
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U.S. national is generally unavoidable. For this reason, concern
about possible prosecution of U.S. nationals is not a valid reason for
refusing to ratify the treaty. A way of protecting some, but not all,
U.S. nationals from ICC jurisdiction would involve modification of
other international agreements allocating concurrent jurisdiction,
such as NATO SOFA. When the United States has no such
agreements with a state that captures a U.S. national, such as
Yugoslavia, the United States may wish to strengthen the primacy
of ICC jurisdiction so that a U.S. national can at least be transferred
to the ICC and enjoy a panoply of due process guarantees in a
neutral forum.5 1 Adherence to the Rome treaty could provide
greater options for protection of U.S. nationals
than
nonadherence. 5 2 It could also provide the United States flexibility
with respect to prosecution or extradition of foreign nationals
accused of international crimes committed outside the United
States.

51.
An amendment to the ICC Statute might recognize ICC primacy over the
jurisdiction of a state on whose territory an international crime within Article 5 has
occurred.
52.
"[O]n becoming a party," the United States could even declare that, for
seven years, it does not accept jurisdiction with respect to "a crime . . . alleged to
have been committed by its nationals." Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 124.
Importantly, this is only an option for signatory states. Further, the conferees,
knowing how to use such language, chose not to allow the state of nationality to
control ICC jurisdictional competence in such a way in any other portion of the
Statute. Concerning other options of parties to the treaty, see, for example, Scheffer,
supra note 5, at 20.
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